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Reflexivity, auto-referentiality, the negativity of self-designation – these are the 
hallmarks not only of the modern in Fredric Jameson’s estimation, but also of desire 
in Jacques Lacan’s discussion of Shakespeare’s Hamlet in Seminar VI.1 In Lacan’s 
analysis, Hamlet’s celebrated question becomes performatively reconfigured as an 
allegory of the process by which the subject encounters the possibility of its non-
being when it accedes to Symbolic representation. What psychoanalysis calls 
“castration,” namely, the ‘forced choice’ to negate oneself that the subject 
paradoxically freely makes when permitting a signifier to stand in for it, is the 
gateway into the dialectic of desire. Indeed, in Lacan’s account, what is remarkable 
about Hamlet – which he emphatically names “the tragedy of desire” – is the way 
Shakespeare’s play presents a kind of blueprint, a “cartography,” of all the possible 
positions one can assume in relation to desire.2 
When he addresses Hamlet and Lacan in the third chapter of Allegory and 
Ideology, Jameson similarly finds Shakespeare’s tragedy operating at multiple levels 
– literal, moral, anagogical, allegorical. Yet what chiefly interests the Marxist critic is 
the play’s staging of the “misrecognized emergence” of modernity. To Jameson, 
Hamlet reads as an unconscious meta-commentary on the historical shift from one 
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mode of production (the monarchy) to another (capitalism) at the close of the 16h 
century. In the figure of Hamlet, Jameson uncovers an emergent modern subject: 
defined by self-reflexivity, traversed by duality, “Hamlet” names the negativity of a 
subject in a state of “ontological playacting.”3 At stake in Jameson’s reading, then, is 
also the status of desire which, for Jmeson, can no longer be assumed to be the 
expression of an authentic subject, arising rather as a structure of deception 
enclosing a void. Mobile, dialectical, self-reflexive, “modern” or Hamletian (Oedipal) 
desire is more attached to its own unfolding quest rather than to any goal of 
fulfilment by a specific object. Such a desire-to-desire coalesces as a floating mood, 
as Jameson conceives it, a certain energy or affect which is principally taken up with 
trying on different positions vis-a-vis the Other. 
For Jameson, then, Hamlet’s ‘modernity’ would lie precisely in the self-
negating, ironic perspective the play simultaneously auto-theorizes and performs, a 
perspective reflecting the play’s own historical situation on the “cusp between two 
worlds.”4 It is as an “incomplete project,” divided between two epistemes, that Hamlet 
appears to Jameson and as such it must remain unsatisfying as a tragedy, the critic 
claims. Ending on an “accidental massacre,” Hamlet’s chaotic and bloody 
denouement fails to deliver the “great allegorical triumph” that should result from a 
“Symbolic” resolution of Hamlet’s desire. This is because, taking place entirely in the 
Imaginary register, the play’s sole “deeper aesthetic satisfaction,” he suggests, can 
come only from the ironic realization of the profound contingency that the play 
unveils as the unconscious truth of dynastic logic. Jameson explains, in Hamlet, 
 
it is the Imaginary that blocks access to any Symbolic solution (whether in the 
form of some true revenge or of a conversion of the mother figure, perhaps 
even of a renunciation of the Ghost’s command altogether). The sense that the 
denouement is cobbled together, in haste and without any genuine necessity, 
is thereby both explained and justified: we are meant to be unsatisfied as the 
very recognition of our fixation in the Imaginary sphere.”5 
 
By way of contrast, Jameson offers a counter-example from Lacan’s account of 
Edgar Allan Poe’s “The Purloined Letter” in Seminar II.6 Here Dupin, able to perceive a 
positive, “Symbolic,” nothing where the police merely see Imaginary absence, 
discovers the Queen’s letter exactly where it should be, that is, in the card-rack “full in 
the view of every visitor” between the ‘legs’ of the mantlepiece… 
The first complex of questions concerns this question of the Imaginary: why should 
the Imaginary be inherently unsatisfying? Recall that the Imaginary is the register of 
what Lacan termed the “mirror stage”. One of Lacan’s most commonly discussed 
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concepts, the stade du miroir first enters Lacan’s public vocabulary in his 1936 
presentation at the 16th Congress of the International Psychoanalytic Association (IPA) 
in Marienbad, and by 1949 appears in more fully worked out form in his 1949 
presentation, published in Écrits as “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function 
as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience.”7 In this text, Lacan elaborates how the I 
or ego is acquired through a process of identification with a specular image. Lacan 
puts it in this way: the ego is “the transformation that takes place in the subject when 
he assumes an image.”8 One’s I would therefore more accurately be called an I-
llusion, based on the miscognition that jump-starts the ego’s circuits and sets a 
temporal dialectic in motion. The I represents the infant’s “jubilant assumption” of an 
imaginary totality at a time when its experience of its body is marked by “motor 
impotence.”9 As a result, the I is essentially “fictional,” a temporal projection, a “statue” 
as Lacan also suggestively calls it, of a future identity that it will never actually reach.10 
Lacan comments, 
 
The mirror stage is a drama whose internal pressure pushes precipitously 
from insufficiency to anticipation – and, for the subject caught up in the lure of 
spatial identification, turns out fantasies that proceed from a fragmented 
image of the body to what I will call an “orthopedic” form of its totality – and to 
the finally donned armour of an alienating identity that will mark his entire 
mental development with its rigid structure.11 
 
Lacan’s reference to the “donned armour” also points to another important feature of 
the I, which is its fundamentally rivalrous nature. In his third seminar, on The 
Psychoses (1955-56), Lacan explains that an “aggressive tension” always dominates 
the Imaginary relation. Because the other “is always on the point of re-adopting the 
place of mastery in relation to [the subject]”, a jealous “either me or the other is 
entirely integrated into every kind of imaginary functioning in man.”12 
These, then, are the chief attributes of the Imaginary: characterized by aggressivity, 
precipitated by a mirror encounter that founds the illusion of an integrated self, the 
ego, “already by itself an other,” sets up a “duality internal to the subject.”13 One 
already sees why Jameson would be interested in the Imaginary– it is because he 
regards it as the register that epitomises the ironic, dual perspective characteristic of 
modernity. He points to Henry James’s The Wings of the Dove as the quintessential 
ironic narrative. In this novel, Merton Densher, one of James’s three main “reflectors,” 
is instructed by his fiancée, Kate Croy to make love to the stricken heroine, Milly 
Theale only to find himself at the end of the tale with his entire subjective perspective 
“brutally torn away.” This is then replicated allegorically, at another level, when we, 
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the readers who have been immersed until this point in Densher’s “subjective 
blindness,” also finally see, as Jameson explains “that the whole plot of The Wings of 
the Dove, which [Densher] has simply lived as his own life, was in reality, when seen 
from the outside, a sordid matter of extortion and prostitution.”14 
This double narrative is encountered in Hamlet as well. For all of the play’s 
ostensible focus on its titular character, Jameson offers that Shakespeare’s play 
could be counter-read as Claudius’s story. Claudius, a figure “beset in his newly 
acquired sovereignty by potential enemies on all sides” is “living in a different plot 
than that of Hamlet himself”:   
 
Norway as well as Hamlet, and later on the Polonius clan and the mob as 
such; the formerly adulterous relationship – and indeed the murder itself – 
being the least of his worries. The designation of a nephew as a regicide then 
has for Claudius a very different meaning than it does for the nephew himself. 
[…] No wonder it is at this point that he cries out in alarm and halts the 
production.”15 
 
In these variants of Hamlet’s plot, Jameson discovers traces of a trauma induced by 
the passing over of an older mode of production, one whose contemporary analogy 
is found in an episode of recent history, which Jameson also references, namely, the 
massacre of the Nepalese monarchy by one of its members at the turn of the last 
century. On June 1st, 2001, the Nepalese Crown Prince Dipendra opened fire on the 
royal palace and killed his father and mother, the King and Queen of Nepal, and 
seven other members of his family, including a younger brother and sister before 
shooting himself in the head. The Nepalese and Hamletian events interact with each 
other as mutually politically unconscious expressions of an historical shift in forms of 
governmentality for, if the motive for the 2001 massacre (at least as the Wikipedia 
account has it) was the Nepalese Prince’s objection to the monarchy becoming a 
constitutional rather than an absolute monarchy, a similar dynamic is traced in 
Hamlet, Jameson recalls, in the shift from the older Stuart Monarchy to an emerging 
capitalist modernity. 
This shift finally converges on the figure of Hamlet. Critics as diverse as 
Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer to Harold Bloom have understood 
Shakespeare’s great accomplishment in this play to lie in his recognition of the 
illusory unity of personality. But crucially, for Jameson, this transition from an older 
model of “personality” to modern “personae” gets negotiated in Hamlet as an 
essentially formal transition whereby the genre of tragic drama cedes to a nascent 
new form: the novel. Thus for Jameson, The Tragedy of Hamlet morphs into “the 
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novel of Hamlet.” And, just as in James’s The Wings of the Dove, Hamlet’s 
unsatisfying ending tears us decisively from older (“Symbolic”) models of resolution, 
the dramatic impulses otherwise racing us towards tragic or comic closure retard 




Having given this – necessarily too cursory – account of Jameson’s richly textured 
chapter, my next set of questions concern what seems a minor observation in 
Jameson’s account: his own “seemingly offhand remark” that the Imaginary register 
seems unlikely to produce a signifier that can take on Symbolic status.16 This 
observation comes in the context of the critic’s reflections on Hamlet’s unsatisfying 
ending where, drawing on Lacan’s discussion of Hamlet’s speech in the famous 
graveyard scene, Jameson comments on the status of Laertes as an Imaginary 
figure. 
What does Lacan himself say about this scene? If one consults the lesson of 
22 April, 1959, we find Lacan deliberating on the following words: 
 
“What is he whose grief 
Bears such an emphasis? whose phrase of sorrow 
Conjures the wand’ring stars, and makes them stand 
Like wonder-wounded hearers? This is I, 
Hamlet the Dane.” 
 
Here is how Lacan interprets Hamlet’s speech: 
 
Not only can Hamlet not stand [Laertes’s] display of grief over the loss of a girl 
whom he had clearly mistreated up until then, but he throws himself into the 
grave with Laertes after having truly bellowed, having given a war cry in which 
he says the most unexpected thing: who is grieving the death of this young 
girl? And he concludes, ‘This is I, Hamlet the Dane’ (V, I, 244-5).17 
 
Extrapolating from Lacan, in his account, Jameson claims that Hamlet’s sudden 
access to his name, “I, Hamlet the Dane” must be understood as the reactivation of 
“the mirror stage with a vengeance.”18 He argues that when Hamlet assumes 
Laertes’s “rhetorical emotions,” he assumes a “pre-prepared Imaginary role of an 
active self or subject.”19 Hamlet is able to give “full-throated expression (without 
consequences)” of his desire, Jameson explains, because death has “neutralized” 
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Ophelia, Hamlet’s “object petit a,” and his desire is “no longer embedded in the 
Oedipal entanglements that unexpectedly came to smother it.”20 However, and this is 
key for Jameson’s argument, what Hamlet fails to understand is the extent to which 
his desiring act is in fact not his at all but, rather, “his service in a role Claudius has 
planned for him.” Hamlet, asserts Jameson deploying Lacan’s phrase, “is le 
champion de l’Autre.” Having had his temporality reset to the clock of the Other, 
Hamlet now shows himself “willing to do battle for his mortal enemy the usurper – 
the King – thereby remaining even more deeply mired in his feudal and familial 
subalternity.”21 
It is this point Jameson makes his comment about the signifier. He writes, 
 
Here in Hamlet it is the Imaginary that blocks access to any Symbolic solution 
(whether in the form of some true revenge or of a conversion of the mother 
figure, perhaps even of a renunciation of the Ghost’s command altogether).22 
As I understand it there can be regressions of a familial signifier into the 
Imaginary realm […] but the promotion of a mirror figure to Symbolic status 
seems a good deal less likely.23 
 
As a pathway into our discussion of Jameson’s comment, we can turn to what Tom 
Cohen has recently named The Throttlecene – a neologism coined to describe the 
acceleration of what can only be described as humanity’s death drive in this moment 
of the late Anthropocene.24 The Throttlecene would be the social formation presiding 
over not only the catastrophic failure of global political responses to the climate 
emergency, but also over what increasingly seems to be the dissolution of the 
neurotic-discursive structures of the modern period – code-named “Hamlet” – insofar 
as they were founded upon Oedipal desire and its repression. The avatars of The 
Throttlecene, Donald Trump, and his B-Team of mini-me’s - Boris, Berlusconi, 
Bolsonaro et. al., would seem to contradict Jameson’s assertion regarding the status 
of the Imaginary signifier. For they assert themselves precisely as Imaginary mirror 
images who have been cleaved onto a Symbolic identity as they oversee a global 
full-scale retreat from the regulatory apparatuses of desire that formerly kept 
jouissance – especially in its metaphorics as capital’s surplus value – in check. For 
we know that progressively since at least the 2008 Global Financial Crisis we have 
entered into a strange new economic reality. What the European Bank still hopefully 
continues to call our “abnormal times” is defined by “modern” or “unconventional” 
monetary policy kitted out with warped economic tools such as negative interest 
rates, quantitative easing, bond buy-backs through so-called “twist programs,” 
among others. 
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In psychoanalytic terms, one might describe these and other striking features of 21st 
century life as symptoms of the collapse of the prevailing, “Hamletian,” structure of 
desire as founded on the repression of the paternal or “familial” signifier: what Lacan 
named the Nom-du-père (the No/Name-of-the-Father). It is worth recalling, too, that 
such neurotic desire definitionally entails the postponement of satisfaction. The 
standard, Oedipal, ‘contract’ states “you must give up your jouissance (your wish to 
sleep with your mother) and accede to the Symbolic identity bestowed by the 
Father’s castrating Name. But in doing so you will regain more than what you lost, at 
a later time, through the operational paths of desire.”25 By contrast, the contemporary 
era of what one might call the “worse Real” marks a lethal pact with the superego’s 
injunction to “Enjoy!”26 Over the past half-century or so, the older “Law of desire” 
seems to have been overthrown by a headless jouissance that promises immediate, 
total satisfaction for all. 
What might this devolution of desire imply for the fate of the paternal signifier? 
Juliet Flower MacCannell, who has been tracking these developments for quite 
some time, has named the post-war period the “Regime of the Brother.”27 She threads 
her insight through an analysis of the Freudian myth of Totem and Taboo. In this 
Freudian “myth,” the band of brothers kill the primal father in order to have access to 
the women of the tribe. But where, in Freud, the brothers quickly discovered that the 
primal Father dead is more powerful than alive, ushering in the “Oedipal” community 
based on the deferral of jouissance, in MacCannell’s account, something has in the 
meantime happened to this social order. A faux modernity, the post-Oedipal era 
betokens a society based on “an absolute right [...] to self- governance, and an 
absolute equality for everyone.”28 “After the patriarchy” we are no longer ruled by 
Symbolic fathers or elders, but by the Imaginary’s fraternity of sons and brothers. 
One might plot these developments across two possible readings of the Ghost of 
King Hamlet. On an initial approach, the Ghost appears to point to the primal Father 
of Totem and Taboo, the one whose unlawful death places an implicit injunction on 
the son to avenge him. Both the son and the Father in this case know that he has 
been killed, they inhabit a “community of knowing,” as Lacan puts it, and in this sense 
the Ghost would be, in essence, superfluous to the play’s unfolding narrative. Lacan 
explains, 
 
This is the important point, the father knows it, and he is the one who comes to 
tell it to us “There needs no ghost, my lord,” – Freud quotes it on several 
occasions because it has become a proverb – “there needs no ghost, my lord 
come from the grave to tell us this” (I, 5, 125).29 
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Yet on a second approach – which both Lacan and, following him, Jameson invoke – 
we encounter another structure of the Ghost, this time as a Father who does not 
know that he is dead. This second interpretation takes its inspiration from a dream by 
a patient of Ella Sharpe’s that Lacan discusses at some length in Seminar VI. In 
Lacan’s recount of Sharpe’s case study, the patient related how the father “was alive 
once more and was talking to him in his usual way, but the remarkable thing was 
that he had really died, only he did not know it.”30 The Father who doesn’t know he is 
dead represents, for Jameson, the waning of the paternal signifier in the late 
capitalist period, entering us into a uniquely ‘Lacanian’ modernity that Jameson 
proposes as the true allegorical horizon of Hamlet, as we will now see. 
By deploying his signature close reading method that enables him to uncover the 
textual evidence of epochal shifts from stylistic ‘symptoms’ exhibited by the literary 
body, Jameson identifies the unconscious traces of this Lacanian modernity in a 
unique expression that is permitted by the French language. This is the grammatical 
term called the “ne explétif – explétif used here in the sense of filling a space in 
language. What is important to note is that this “ne” is optional. It is only used after 
certain verbs, verbs expressing a negative feeling. However, the “ne explétif must be 
distinguished from negation proper, which in French, as one knows, takes the form 
of “ne pas” (“not”). The not-quite equivalent in English, in Bruce Fink’s translation, is 
the colloquial phrase “not but.” 
Lacan’s example of the ne explétif (or “expressive ne”) is the phrase, “Je crains 
qu’il ne vienne” - “I am afraid he will come,” which he glosses in this way: 
 
In the turn of phrase, Je crains qu’il ne vienne”, the most elementary analytic 
art can sense the desire that constitutes the ambivalence characteristic of the 
unconscious. […]. In its uncertain obsolescence, […], this ne suggests the idea 
of a trace that is effaced along the path of a migration or, more precisely, of a 
puddle that brings out its outline.31 
 
For Jameson, this dangling “ne”, not fully a negation but still expressing some kind of 
negative affect, could be read as the French language’s formal registration of the 
contemporary post-Oedipal unconscious. Through this textual symptom, the Father’s 
supplanting by another historical form of the signifier is unconsciously signaled, even 
if, like Shakespeare’s audience, we are as yet incapable of recognizing this. Jameson 
writes, “Perhaps our own moment of late capitalism is in a similar situation, of denial 
and rebirth.”32 And indeed, this quite aptly seems to sum up our contemporary 
situation. If, in 1959, Lacan claimed that “The tragedy of Hamlet is the tragedy which 
from a certain point of view, literally, brings this fool, this clown, this player on words 
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down to zero,” in contemporary public discourse this zero no longer seems to retain 
any negative power. In a ‘post-truth’ world, any saying can be contradicted or 
overturned. Always able to be rescinded as mere “sarcasm,” Trump’s Throttlecene 
presides over a “No” that neither prohibits nor prevents.”33 
Again, why should this not be surprising? The primary characteristic of an 
Imaginary social order, as MacCannell explains, once more referencing Freud’s 
Group Psychology, is that the original Father or ego-ideal, the figure who wields the 
true power of the negative – “castration” – has  been replaced by what Freud termed 
a Leader. Needing only, as Freud puts it, “to possess the typical qualities of the 
individuals concerned in a particularly clearly marked and pure form,” the Leader 
recasts the exceptional status of the Father by entering into Symbolic circulation as 
just one of the brothers or sons. As such, the group identifies with an Imaginary figure 
– the hypnotic ideal-ego – who, far from prohibiting enjoyment, promises equal 
satisfaction for everyone. By way of its identification with an image, a mere 
appearance of the No, “the Oedipally split ego is healed, made whole, with no further 
need to sacrifice its jouissance to the collective.”34 
Thus the Leader brings a third structure of the Ghost, as the special province 
of Vladimir Nabokov, into our discussion. In his 1947 dystopian novel, Bend Sinister, 
Nabokov parodies the “infamous models” totalitarianism represented by Hitler’s 
Germany and Stalin’s Soviet Union. About halfway into the novel, we learn about an 
upcoming production of Shakespeare’s Hamlet by the new State Theater, directed 
by the playwright Ember. Ember has been required by his authoritarian government 
to base his production on a certain late Professor Hamm’s revised edition, “The Real 
Plot of Hamlet,” in which the focus of the play is not on Hamlet but rather on 
Fortinbras, who is described as “a blooming young knight, beautiful and sound to the 
core.” This “fine Nordic youth” has assumed the control of “miserable Denmark which 
had been so criminally misruled by degenerate King Hamlet and Judeo-Latin 
Claudius.”35 
The twist in Professor Hamm’s revision of Shakespeare’s plot is the realization 
that the Ghost on the battlements is not old King Hamlet’s: 
 
It is that of Fortinbras the Elder whom King Hamlet has slain. The ghost of the 
victim posing as the ghost of the murderer – what a wonderful bit of farseeing 
strategy, how deeply it excites our intense admiration! [… ]. Thus, old 
Fortinbras, disguised as his enemy’s ghost, prepares the peril of his enemy’s 
son and the triumph of his own offspring. No, the ‘judgements’ were not so 
accidental, the ‘slaughters’ not so casual as they seemed to Horatio the 
Recorder, and there is a note of deep satisfaction (which the audience cannot 
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help sharing) in the young hero’s gutteral exclamation – Ha-ha, this quarry 
cries on havoc (meaning: the foxes have devoured one another) as he surveys 
the rich heap of dead bodies, all that is left of the rotten state of Denmark.36 
 
In Nabokov, the Father is finally recognized as an imposter. Nabokov’s insight lies in 
the realization that the paternal signifier was never anything other than a semblance 
that duped us into becoming its subjects.37 And, crucially, as a consequence of this 
discovery, the orders of negation it inaugurated also transform. Under the older, 
Oedipal model of desire, as Justin Clemens once quipped, the neurotic subject says 
“’Yes’ to the No,” meaning that the neurotic represses the paternal signifier’s 
prohibition on jouissance. The perverse subject, by contrast, says “’Yes and No’ to the 
No,” disavowing the prohibition by publicly acceding to it while maintaining a private 
space of the fetish where the father’s power is denied, whereas in psychosis, the 
subject says “’No’ to the No,” decisively foreclosing it.38 What one sees emerging in 
the meantime, however, is yet another organization of the psychic ‘choice,’ one that 
seems to elude altogether this logic of the yes or no: it is a fake or Make-Believe 
Father, a semblable of the “No” that proffers the subject a sort of Get-Out-of-Jail-Free 
card, usable at any narrative level. This ‘Nomblable-du-père’ would be the ultimate 
“Trump” card of the new psycho-social order in the process of dismantling the older, 
monopolizing Oedipal logic from all possible directions. 
But at the same time, as if séanced by this blabbling, a fourth structure of the 
Ghost now inserts itself – or, rather, a spectre in Derrida’s sense, that is, as a certain 
“spectral asymmetry [that] interrupts all specularity.39 A non-specular entity, it takes 
the vibratory shape of M. Valdemar in the Poe story who awakens from the hypnotic 
trance he has been suspended in on the brink of death: 
 
“Yes;—no;—I have been sleeping—and now—now—I am dead.”40 
 
Seeping through Poe’s horizontal em-dashes, something streams away from Time’s 
uni-directional arrow: a dead man who has slept through his own death and 
discovers himself in the act of decomposing. 
 
“For God’s sake!—quick!—quick!—put me to sleep—or, quick!—waken me!—
quick!—I say to you that I am dead!” 
 
As I rapidly made the mesmeric passes, amid ejaculations of “dead! dead!” 
absolutely bursting from the tongue and not from the lips of the sufferer, his 
whole frame at once—within the space of a single minute, or even less, 
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shrunk—crumbled—absolutely rotted away beneath my hands. Upon the bed, 
before that whole company, there lay a nearly liquid mass of loathsome—of 
detestable putridity.41 
 
M. Valdemar arrives as a “post-death” spectre, haunting the contemporary moment 
as a time “out of joint” with every previous historical epoch. Projecting onto some 
kind of ‘fourth dimension’ which would exceed the Real-Imaginary-Symbolic triad, 
this a-spectral, a-symmetrical, a-specular a-llogic invokes some form of “rationality” 
that as Lacan puts it in Seminar XXI, Les non-dupes errent has yet “to be 
constructed.”42 
In a recent essay, “Shakespeare’s Global Weirding: MacBeth’s Posting of 
‘Anthropos,’ Cinematization, and the Era of Extinction,” Tom Cohen suggested that 
Hamlet is “the nodal text of climate change.”43 Hamlet, as he puts it, “is of the time 
after irreversibility has been triggered.”44 This is because for us, just as it was for 
Hamlet, it is no longer a question of the knowledge that impelled desire and its 
interpretation along. We already “know” everything we need to know about climate 
change, Cohen writes, “there is nothing more to learn, only things to put off, defer, 
delay.”45 Old King Hamlet’s Ghost would be allied with this double-knowledge of 
climate change, Cohen observes, as we simultaneously accelerate towards ecocide 
while still continuing on as ‘normal.’ From out of this – Humanity’s own comic 
graveyard scene – Poe’s M. Valdemar awakens from the hypnotic trance cast by the 
phallic signifier which suspended us in a state of non-being and tied us to the Other’s 
time. 
How does one evacuate from the Other’s time whose clock has almost run 
down? From this perspective I would say that, pace Jameson, the problem with 
Hamlet is not that it is unsatisfying but that it is not deeply dissatisfying enough. As 
one knows, the unshakeable Law of desire is its eternal dissatisfaction and infinite 
postponement. As such, desire presents a life-sustaining openness that, at least in 
Milly Theale’s case, enabled her to ward off her apotheosis, preventing the linguistic 
totality from closing in on her.46 The hyper-jouissance of The Throttlecene, on the 
other hand, maps out only the dead-ends of Imaginary rivalrous aggression, acted 
out beneath the gaze of a hyper-elite that surveys with a “deep satisfaction” a 
devastated, depopulated, “rotten state” of Earth. But if even the world’s 1% are 
starting to question how rich is rich enough to buy themselves out of the Earth’s 
increasingly uninhabitable climate, as new political solidarities and new ‘evental 
names’47 begin to re-carve the social fabric, what protocols of reading would be 
appropriate for such changed and changing conditions? That is, if the Oedipal 
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historical model of desire and its interpretation has exhausted its routines, what 
might take its place? 
The method of Freudian psychoanalysis was founded upon the supposition of 
a repressed wish whose coded message, concealed in the neurotic symptom, could 
be decrypted through the method of free association. However, the clinical 
presentations of the 21st century include a dramatic rise in affect and anxiety. 
Borderline personality structures, PTSD, toxicomania, somatic phenomena, these are 
features of a different relation to jouissance that the Belgian analysts, Paul 
Verhaeghe and Stijn Vanheule, identify as the structure of “actual neurosis.” As such, 
they do not lend themselves well to traditional forms of analytic interpretation.48 
Accordingly, the Lacanian must update her methods. Indeed, already over a decade 
ago, Lacan’s son-in-law, Jacques-Alain Miller provoked the analytic community by 
saying the object (a) is “the ultimate waste of a grandiose attempt.”49 Miller 
maintained that if what is needed today is a way of interpreting “against the grain of 
the unconscious,” what he, following Lacan, calls “reverse interpretation” involves 
“withholding S2” (knowledge) in order “to circumscribe S1” (the paternal signifier). 
“Reverse interpretation” therefore eschews the technique of punctuation that 
characterized the older Lacanian session. Punctuation seeks to generate new 
knowledge in the form of the creation of new signifiers but a post-interpretive 
analysis aims instead to bring the subject back to its “primarily elementary signifiers.” 
It will be a question of another dimension – a hybrid mixture of signifier and letter 
such as a number, say 0, inflating itself into a letter: O… 
In Nabokov’s revised Hamlet, Denmark was crippled by a “plethora of words”: 
 
If the state is to be saved, if the nation desires to be worthy of a new robust 
government, then everything must be changed, popular commonsense must 
spit out the caviar of moonshine and poetry, and the simple word, verbum sine 
ornatu, intelligible to man and beast alike, and accompanied by fit action, must 
be restored to power.50 
 
And yet the only thing that brings the playwright, Ember, out of his depression is 
precisely a play of words. As he attempts to cheer him up, the philosopher Adam 
Krug describes “a curious character [...], a man who was fanatically eager to make a 
film out of Hamlet.”51 In what follows are six pages of an imaginary screenplay of 
Hamlet, a fantastic weaving in and out of different temporalities and subjectivities 
circling around Ophelia’s name. Ophelia, spinning out as a letteral combination in 
rotation, thwarts all forward movement, liquifying the Cartesian subject. Lacan’s 
famous S is carelessly “lost in the damp grass”: 
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Yes, she was found by a shepherd. In fact her name can be derived from that 
of an amorous shepherd in Arcadia. Or quite possibly it is an anagram of 
Alpheios, with the “S” lost in the damp grass – Alpheus the rivergod, who 
pursued a long-legged nymph until Artemis changed her into a stream, which 
of course suited his liquidity to a tee. [...]. Or again we can base it on the Greek 
rendering of an old Danske serpent name. Lithe, lithping, thin-lipped Ophelia, 
Amleth’s wet dream, a mermaid of Lethe, a rare water serpent, Russalka 
letheana of science (to match your long purples).52 
 
The post-Hamletian analytic session seeks to construct an “a-semantic unity,” 
bringing the subject back to the originary “hey non nonny nonny” nonsense of the 
signifier. Nabokov’s hybrid, ‘cinaesthetic’ writing is similarly de-identifying, de-




At the end of his discussion of Act V, scene one, the graveyard scene in Hamlet, we 
encounter a rare Lacan finally expressing his own desire. “I wish,” he muses, that 
 
someone would paint a picture in which one would see a cemetery on the 
horizon, and here the hole of the grave, people going away like people at the 
end of the Oedipal tragedy dispersing and covering their eyes in order not to 
see what is happening, namely something which with respect to Oedipus is 
more or less the liquefaction of Mr. Valdemar.53 
 
What seeps, suppuratingly, through the cut of the paternal signifier? Serpentine, 
“dreamily droning” as if from “from some deep cavern within the earth,” a certain 
“slim slimy ophidian maiden”54  repels the sons of Hamlet and James. “Still better and 
worse” (III.2. 2143), Ophelia, a mal-allegory, signally fails to distinguish between 
narrative levels and their respective orders of negation. All of the histories of Kronos 
and Logos dissolve in the encircling vortex of her watery embrace. The structures of 
knowledge splutter and gag. Hyperreflexive to the last, Hamlet and his forty thousand 
brothers (“all Lamord’s pupils”55) stopper their ears but her roar is abyssal: “You are 
naught, you are naught. I’ll mark the play” (III.2, 2038). 
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Figure 1: A visualisation of the path of Storm Ophelia as it was expected to hit 
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